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Ranking Risks*
Banuch Fischhoff
A Challenging Ideal
Risks are everywhere. How do we decide which ones are worthy of
our attention? In an ideal world, on some regular basis, we would review
our priorities systematically. That would begin by listing all the risks we
face, ordered according to the threat posed by each. It would continue by
listing each option for controlling each risk, characterized by some estimate
of its effectiveness and cost. It would conclude by identifying the "best
buys" in risk reduction, the strategies that achieve the greatest reductions
at the least cost. Those costs might be measured in dollars, time, effort,
nagging or whatever other resources we have to invest in risk management.
As a by-product, this analytical process would leave a list of residual risks,
which we cannot reduce at any reasonable price, but which continue to
be matters of concern.
In reality, though, such systematic reviews of risk are as rare as
systematic reviews of how we spend our time, money or emotions. One
obvious constraint on any of these activities is lack of time to perform
them. However, even with all the time in the world, there would still be
daunting obstacles. Risks are so diverse that it is hard to compile either
the list of threats or the set of possible control strategies. We seldom have
ready access to credible estimates of the sizes of the risks, the chances for
control or the costs of amelioration. Often, the ranking scientific experts
know little more.
If we had those figures, we would then have to face difficult tradeoffs.
Many of these involve wrenching choices between "your money or your
life." More precisely, they ask about our willingness to sacrifice concrete
dollars in return for changes in the probability of injury or death. Even if
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we knew how to make the tradeoffs posed by individual risk-control
options, we would still have to prioritize the different risks competing for
the same limited resources. For example, do we invest our research dollars
in attempts to reduce the risks of injury, heart disease or cancer? Do we
invest our nagging budget in warning our teens about sex, drugs, beer,
mixed drinks, AIDS or driving (not to mention skipping school, cheating
and getting assignments in late)?
These are not only intellectual challenges. They also confront us
with difficult ethical, social and emotional choices. What we do about
risks defines us as individuals and as citizens, showing what we value and
what we accept as our personal responsibility. Any risk that we neglect
can come back to haunt us. Any risk that we face (or explicitly ignore)
raises uncomfortable concerns. Any risk that we place on our own agenda
may be taken off the plates of others, including those who create and
benefit from it.
The next section of this essay offers an account of how individuals
might respond to these challenges, whether considering risks under their
personal control or ones that they hope to influence through social and
political processes. The following two sections consider the role of
government in helping citizens to manage risks, first in principle and then
in the practical context of recent risk-ranking exercises. The essay then
offers a general procedure for risk ranking. It concludes by discussing
what can be done with a list of risks.
A Descriptive Account
Faced with such complex problems, we usually just muddle along.
We have in place a set of practices that have evolved over time. Some, we
have adopted deliberately (e.g., low-salt diets). Others were imposed upon
us (e.g., automatic seat belts). Still others were copied from friends with
little attention to safety (e.g., smoking) or are of uncertain origin (e.g.,
triple checking the stove before leaving the house).
Every once in a while, something happens that calls our habits into
question. It may make us wonder whether we are needlessly investing in
risk control or recklessly leaving ourselves exposed. In many lives, these
occasions may come with unnerving frequency. Every Thursday's New
EnglandJournalofMedicine brings revisions in estimates of some risk's
size or some control strategy's effectiveness. Many Tuesdays' Science Times
brings coverage of more slowly breaking revisions. Most weeks, some TV
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news magazine featires a health risk or quack cure. Almost every night,
local news broadcasts present threats to personal safety, from crime, fire
or traffic. Over time, these reports filter into everyday conversation, reaching
those who are not news junkies or direct observers. News about risks also
arises sporadically in our personal lives, for example, through injuries to
friends, reports of asbestos in schools or plans to site nuisances in our
neighborhoods (ranging from hazardous waste facilities to half-way houses).
On the positive side, these confrontations offer chances to rethink
our priorities. They may force us to think in some depth about unpleasant
topics that we might otherwise ignore. They may facilitate collective
action or changes in long-standing behaviors. Over time, reviewing the
treatment of individual risks should bring our overall priorities in line.
However, having our agenda set in this way has its limitations. One
is that nomination may have little to do with the magnitude of risks
involved, the usefulness of any new information or opportunities to act.
Unfortunately, it is often hard to tell whether a featured risk is worth
worrying about. It is rare to find a concise summary of a risk's magnitude
or the quality of the underlying science As a result, citizens must divine
the size and certainty of risks from indirect cues. One common, reasonable,
but imperfect inference is that if seemingly responsible people raise an
issue, then it must be important and they must know something about it.
A complementary assumption is that important risks will get reported
expeditiously. However, scientists can seize center stage with studies that
are important to them personally but that add little to overall understanding;
news media often retell familiar stories, while neglecting more serious
risks; issues may be ignored just because the story is hard to tell.
Once an issue attracts attention, group processes can take on lives
of their own, generating further cues as to the magnitude of a risk. For
example, if institutions are perceived as responding callously, citizens may
conclude, "if they're so high-handed, they must be hiding something." A
forceful public may be construed as strident or hysterial, leading its concerns
to be discounted. Risk debates may really be about not losing to tle
villains (jerks, etc.) on the other side.2 Whether inadvertent or deliberate,
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poor communication can aggravate whatever "natural" misunderstandings
people have about risks.'
Moreover, even the best reporting leaves open the question of how
important each risk is and how much its control is worth.4 Better
communication will sometimes show dominating alternatives and clear-cut
"best buys" in risk reduction. At other times, though, it will just paint a
starker picture of a difficult reality. Coping with that reality requires not
only processing a lot of information, but also seeing it from many
perspectives. It means avoiding the risk of "framing," whereby, in
circumstances with limited opportunities for reflection, people's preferences
prove sensitive to formally irrelevant aspects of how tradeoffs are described.'
Possible Government Roles
Government has some natural advantages in facing these tasks. It
has far greater resources than individuals for assembling evidence and
analyzing it from diverse perspectives. However, government faces the
same obstacles as individuals. It, too, must compile a comprehensive list
of risks, including those that are, for whatever reason, commonly ignored.
It must summarize the scientific evidence, with adequate representation
sake of comparisons, it must render those risks
of uncertainties. For the
6
in some common units.

Yet, even with unlimited budgets, government analysts could not
solve the risk-ranking problem unambiguously. Each step of the process
involves value judgments. It is a question of ethics, not science, to determine
which risks can even be considered, how "risk" is to be measured, how
the different dimensions of risk should be weighted and how uncertainty
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should be treated! The rankings of risks, and of risk-reduction strategies,
will depend on how these issues are resolved. As a result, there will be
differences in whose welfare is protected and whose risk-producing activities
are restrained. The open nature of government analyses should make such
choices relatively transparent. Unfortunately, government analysts often
lack explicit legal mandates to make them. Even where there is statutory
guidance, it may lack credibility. For example, it is one thing to require
cost-benefit analyses, quite another to make people comfortable with valueof-a-life calculations.
Under these circumstances, government analysts can address value
issues in several ways. One general strategy is to make as few assumptions
as possible, reporting the results in something approaching raw form,
assembling the data without digesting them. The work product might
include weakly comparable estimates, expressed in different units and
accompanied by frank discussions of the sources, assumptions and
limitations. Any integration would be left to consumers of the data.
A second strategy is to integrate the evidence in several different
ways, each reflecting an alternative value system. Doing so would not
prejudge which values are appropriate (among those that are considered).
Rather, the analysts would run the numbers under these different
assumptions. Relieved of this computational load, citizens could8 locate
themselves in the "space" created by the alternative value systems.
A third strategy is to elicit values from citizens, then derive the
analytically appropriate rankings implied by them. Its success depends on
these individuals' ability to express their values in the abstract form required
by analytical models. That means grappling with difficult ethical questions,
using unfamiliar formats and producing public statements. It requires the
analysts to carry the citizens along, so that they will see the rankings as
expressing the values that they have provided.9
Finally, one could allow citizens' panels to determine the rankings
with technical staff at their service, explicating the risk data and perhaps
suggesting alternative perspectives. The credibility of a citizens' panel
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would depend on the populations whose values it represents. If a panel
could not converge on a single ranking, it could at least show the array
(or disarray) of lay opinion.
Experiments in Ranking
The choice of approach depends, obviously, on the particulars of
the situation. For example, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) ° has
adopted the first approach in its current study of risks to students in
school. It has performed the arduous chore of identifying and assembling
data from diverse sources. However, it lacks the resources for protracted
interactions with citizens (other than Congressional representatives and
staff) and the authority to determine a definitive set of values by fiat.
In contrast, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)" has
conducted several internal ranking exercises, as a way of articulating its
own priorities. However, participants were restricted to its own staff and
advisory committees. Citizens were consulted only through the indirect
and imprecise medium of public opinion surveys. EPA concluded that
these surveys showed marked discrepancies between the Agency's rankings
and those held by the public. If real (and not just methodological artifacts),
these discrepancies could reflect differences in perceptions of either scientific
or value issues. The sources of such disagreements are, however, notoriously
difficult to decode.12 Surveys typically offer respondents little time to
think, opportunity to express complicated thoughts or chance to clarify
ambiguous questions.
EPA's response has attempted to bridge this gap through direct
interaction with citizens. 3 Specifically, it has promoted state and local
risk-ranking exercises. In them, diverse panels of citizens develop rankings
of risk, over a period of time and with considerable staff support. These
protracted interactions allow participants to mull the complicated issues,
clarify apparent differences, recruit needed information and negotiate
compromises (if they are to be found). Several dozen such exercises are in
Office of Technology Assessment, Risks to Children in Schools (1995).
II
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varying stages of planning and completion, producing consensus documents
from surprisingly diverse audiences. Their very existence shows a
noteworthy willingness to seek compromise.
One critical ingredient in this success has apparently been that each
panel is allowed to structure the work as it wishes. The price for conferring
such freedom is that there is no common format for the different ranking
exercises, no explicit role for analytical procedures and no systematic way
to uncover the values underlying the rankings. As a result, it is difficult to
generalize results and explicate their rationale. Non-participants may have
difficulty accepting rankings derived from unspecified values. Government
analysts may lack the explicit guidance needed to translate the rankings
into regulations. There may be no way to integrate the results of different
ranking exercises.
One Way to Rank Risks
A successful risk-ranking method faces many simultaneous demands.
It must reflect the underlying science faithfully, capture the critical
*dimensions of that science, present that information comprehensibly, secure
the input of citizens' values, reach a stable conclusion and convey it
credibly to the broad public.
Recently, we proposed a risk-ranking method which, we hope,
represents a reasonable compromise among these demands.14 It is not
perfect, nor completely specified. However, it identifies the critical design
issues that any deliberate ranking would face and offers an initial approach
to them. That is, it provides a task analysis for those who would rank
risks, along with one possible response to it. It hopes to capitalize on the
successful social process and thoughtful treatment of risk assessment in
EPA's risk ranking, while strengthening its analytical core. It was initially
produced in response to a request from the Office of Science and Technology
Policy for a method that federal agencies could use to prioritize risks,
5
within programs, across programs and across agencies.
Legislation introduced into the 104th Congress (and its immediate
predecessors) calls for a dramatic expansion in the use of risk comparisons
(e.g., H.R. 9). Whatever form these proposals eventually take, they will
need to address the issues raised here. Our procedure involves six steps:
M. Granger Morgan et al., A Procedure for Risk Ranking for Federal Risk
Management Agencies (Working paper for OSTP 1994).
15
Ranking Risks, (Paul Portney, ed. in press, Resources for the Future).
14

6 Risk- Health, Safety & Environment 191 [Summer 1995]

1. Define and Categorizethe Risks
The universe of relevant risks first must be identified and then must
be sorted into a modest number L< 30) of roughly comparable risk categories.
Those categories should be simple, well-defined, exhaustive, mutually
exclusive and sufficiently homogenous that each can be considered in the
same light. A rough screening for order of magnitude is needed to avoid
creating a few categories lumping extremely large risks - so that the hard
work of ranking is merely postponed (until the time comes to deal with
the contents of those large categories).
One natural categorization is according to existing regulatory
programs. However, those programs may reflect the chaotic bureaucratic
and political processes that prompted the need for systematic prioritization
in the first place. Categorization might also reflect the source of the risk
(e.g., power plants), the agent of risk (e.g., ozone) or the failure mode
(e.g., low-level wind shear). Thus, for example, the FAA might decide to
categorize risks by source and failure mode. Its sources might be civilian
and commercial aircraft, while failure modes might include icing problems,
wind shear, engine fires, loss of communication, etc. If so, then one
category of risks to be ranked by FAA might be: wind shear accidents
involving commercial aircraft.
2. Identify the RelevantAttributes ofRisk
Risk is a complex concept. Expected numbers of deaths and injuries
are clearly important, but a variety of other considerations, or attributes,
may also matter. To the extent possible, these attributes should be:
comprehensive (to ensure that nothing important has been left out); nonredundant (to avoid double-counting); preferentially independent (for
simpler evaluation procedures); measurable (for explicit and consistent
estimates) and minimalin number (to reduce complexity). Because some
criteria (e.g., comprehensive, minimal in number) can conflict, the process
of choosing attributes will have to involve judicious compromises.
The compromise that we proposed characterizes each risk according
to the three dimensions of risk that have emerged in psychometric studies
of perceived risk: 16 number ofpeople affected, knowledge and dread.Because
those studies focused on risks"to humans, ecologicalimpact was added as a
fourth dimension. For any given hazard, people's judgments about attributes
16
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that fall within one of these sets tend to show high inter-attribute
correlations. In contrast, comparisons of attributes that lie in different
sets display low inter-attribute correlations. Thus, as long as the attributes
used in the ranking process include a few attributes from each set, the
results of a ranking process should not to depend very much on which
specific attributes are used.
We propose that rankers select two markers for each dimension,
from the large set of highly correlated possibilities. For example, "dread"
could also be measured by individual controllability, catastrophic potential
and outcome equity (among other possibilities). This procedure will allow
rankers to choose marker attributes that they find meaningful, while
ensuring that the rankings produced by groups using different markers
would be similar (because of the correlations among alternative markers
and the coverage of the four dimensions). Our full proposal offers
operationalizations of 4-6 possible markers for each dimension.
Table i17
A Possible Quantitative Summary of Risks
Number of people
affected
Annual expected
number of fatalities
0-450-600
(10% chance, zero)
Annual expected

Degree of
environmental
impact

Knowledge

Dread

Area affected by
ecosystem stress or
change
50 km2

Degree to which
impacts are delayed

Catastrophic
potential

1 - 10 years

1000 x expected
annual fatalities

Magnitude of

Quality of scientific

number of
person-years lost
0- 9000 - 18000

environmental impact

understanding

modest

medium

(10% chance, zero)

(15% chance, large)

Outcome equity

medium

(ratio = 6)

3. Describe the Risks
Once the categories and attributes are set, technical staff would
summarize the scientific evidence for each. In a standard format that
summary would include (a) a qualitative description of the risk, (b) a
quantitative evaluation of the risk in terms of each chosen attribute and
(c) a brief description of the state of scientific understanding (expressing
uncertainty, broadly defined). Table 1 shows a possible format for the
17
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quantitative summary. To accommodate rankers with diverse educational
background, the narrative summaries should be no more technical that
PopularScience. To facilitate making comparisons, the summary forms
should be small enough to be easily handled and sorted. For example, one
might use legal-sized sheet of paper, turned sideways and folded in half,
with the tabular summary of Table 1 appearing on the cover page under a
brief description of the risk and followed by the narrative. Technical staff
would be available to provide whatever additional detail is needed.
4. Select the Groups ofRankers
The rankers should represent those citizens whose values are to be
captured. In our worked example, focused on establishing priorities for
federal agencies, we proposed four independent groups: one with federal
agency risk personnel, one with state and local risk managers and two
groups of laypeople. Each group would reflect the diversity of its underlying
population. Their opinions would be interpreted as the conclusions that
similar citizens would reach were they to invest similar effort in these
topics. Membership would be limited to 10-15, in order to allow for
active participation by all. Groups would manage their own affairs, with
staff support. They would select their own chair and vice-chair, who
would receive suitable training in the procedure and in group process.
Multiple groups are used to increase confidence that the results are robust
and not just the product of particular group dynamics. Constituting
groups with similar levels of technical expertise (about risks and about
regulation) is intended to promote interaction among equals.
5. Perform the Rankings
We propose a series of four meetings, during which each group would
seek a consensual ranking. Before beginning this process in earnest, members
would individually evaluate the risks using a simplified multi-attribute
weighting approach. Toward the end of a group's sessions, members
would review its tentative conclusions in the light of these initial individual
rankings. This form of triangulation is intended to protect individuals
against framing effects, by asking them to reconcile two potentially different
ways of looking at the problem. It is intended to protect groups against
dominating personalities or collective myopia by giving equal standing to
each members' initial position. Upon completing its work, each group
would select representatives to an intergroup synthesis meeting. This
meeting would seek the maximum consensus that is possible, within the
constraints that the constituent groups set for their representatives. The
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final agreement, ratified by the four groups, would be announced with
suitable fanfare.
In all these deliberations, the emphasis is on sorting the risk categories
into a few broad classes, paying particular attention to identifying those
risks that deserve the highest - and the lowest - ranks. The groups
should not expend energy on the meaningless task of precisely ordering
risk categories whose ranks broadly overlap. The greatest benefit of the
whole exercise is likely to come from identifying risks with clear ranks,
especially ones that are not commensurate with the resources invested in
their management.

6 Providea Reasonably Rich Description
The same summary ranking can mean quite different things if it
reflects a strong consensus or a weak plurality of views. It can motivate
different actions if residual disagreements reflect conflicting values or
alternative interpretations of uncertain scientific evidence. As a result, an
appropriate summary is needed, capturing these sources of disagreement,
as well as any problematic procedural issues. While a clear consensus may
be needed to break political deadlocks, clearly characterized disagreements
can still focus future research and debate.
Our full proposal considers various other issues, such as how to
balance the confidentiality needed for frank discussions with the openness
needed for credibility with nonparticipants (as well as complying with
open-meeting laws). It also identifies unresolved issues and highlights the
need to evaluate procedures before implementation.
What Can One Do with a Risks Ranking?
In a sense, risk ranking can do no more than satisfy curiosity. A list
of risks carries no necessary implications for action. Big risks might be
neglected if nothing could be done; small risks might be reduced if that
could be done cheaply. Ultimately, one wants to rank not risks, but
actions, to identify the best buys in risk reduction.
Public risk-ranking processes have typically stopped short of
recommending actions. In part, this has occurred because those conducting
them lacked the authority to go further. For example, OTA was not
asked to determine what to do about risks to students in school; EPA's
voluntary consensus-building might have collapsed had they attempted to
take the next step.
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In principle, this is a disappointing conclusion to such ambitious
efforts. In practice, though, consensual risk rankings can make a difference
even without solving the political problems of securing a mandate for
change or the intellectual problems of mapping risks to actions. If a risk is
clearly small, cheap controls should not be foregone. Yet, neither should
they be sought too actively. If a risk is clearly large, it deserves attention
unless there is some immutable reason why it cannot be reduced. At
times, there will be a simple risk-action connection, so that consensus on
the former will carry to the latter. If several small risks obviously have
common treatment, they could be grouped (and moved up the list).
At times, it may become apparent that there is no way to transfer
resources from overmanaged risks to undertreated ones. Such situations
can provoke anger insofar as some implicit promise of fungibility underlies
the exercise. (Why compare risks if nothing can be done about reordering
their priorities?) Meaningless risk comparisons are widely held to be a
source of public anger at risk managers.'" Yet, such anger may be needed
to create a mandate for change. An agency frustrated with its enabling
legislation might even take the calculated gamble of inviting public anger,
hoping that the resulting furor will position it better for the long run.
The dangers with provoking anger at mistaken priorities is that the
resulting turmoil might throw out the good with the bad. Times of
change are often times for mischief, with those closest to the seats of
power attempting to settle private accounts under the banner of public
reform. Our proposal is intended to promote the possibility of orderly
change, by increasing confidence that it can be done in an open, regulated
and scientifically credible way. Its underlying article of faith is that a
well-managed, mutually respectful process will reveal some significant
areas of agreement, even among diverse individuals. The result will be
fewer, but better focused, conflicts than would arise without such an
opportunity.
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